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Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) protocol and its variants, e.g. phase-matching
(PM) QKD and TF-QKD based on sending or not sending, are highly attractive since they are
able to overcome the well-known rate-loss limit for QKD protocols without repeater: R = O(η)
with η standing for the channel transmittance. However, all these protocols require active phase
randomization and post-selection that play an essential role together in their security proof. Coun-
terintuitively, we find that in TF-QKD, beating the rate-loss limit is still possible even if phase
randomization and post-selection in the coding mode are both removed, which means our final se-
cure key rate R = O(√η). Furthermore, our protocol is more feasible in practice and more promising
according to its higher final key rate in the valid distance. Our security proof counters collective
attack and can also counter coherent attack in asymptotical case.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the help of quantum key distribution
(QKD), two distant agents (Alice and Bob) are able
to share secret key bits in the sense of information-
theoretical security[1–7]. Albeit impressive pro-
gresses on QKD experiments[8–14] have been made,
there is a fundamental limit on secret key rate
R versus channel transmittance η. This limit is
sufficiently discussed by researchers[15, 16] and fi-
nally revealed as the linear key rate bound R 6
− log2(1 − η)[16]. For a long distance, the trans-
mittance is much smaller, then R = O(η). Surpris-
ingly, this limit was overcome by the twin-field (TF)
QKD protocol proposed in 2018[17] . One may note
that the security proof of TF-QKD has been rebuilt
in Ref.[18], although its original security analysis in
Ref.[17] is not strict. The physics behind TF-QKD
is that Alice and Bob prepare photon-number su-
perposition remotely via coherent states and post-
selection.
Inspired by TF-QKD, phase-matching (PM) QKD
protocol is introduced in Ref.[19]. In PM-QKD pro-
tocol, Alice (Bob) prepares weak coherent states
| ± √µ〉 randomly and adds a random phase φA
(φB) to each of her (his) weak coherent states, then
sends them to an untrusted party Charlie located
in the middle of the channel. Depending on the
measurement results declared by Charlie, Alice and
∗ yinzq@ustc.edu.cn
† wshuang@ustc.edu.cn
Bob are able to generate raw key bits after post-
selection of the cases satisfying φA ≈ φB . Another
variant of TF-QKD is based on sending or not send-
ing weak coherent pulse, which can be very robust
under large optical misalignment error[20] but the
final key rate is not satisfactory. In its decoy mode,
phase randomization and post-selection are still nec-
essary. Consequently, in TF-QKD and its variants,
active phase randomization and post-selection seem
indispensable to the security of sifted key bits .
However, the phase post-selection may impair its
secret key rate in practice. It is still an open question
if the active phase randomization and phase post-
selection can be removed. Here, we firstly introduce
a simplified TF-QKD protocol, in which its key bit
is encoded in phase 0 or pi, but unlike PM-QKD, the
coding mode does not employ active phase random-
ization and thus phase post-selection is also circum-
vented. Therefore, its coding mode is simple and the
security proof is totally different from previous pro-
tocols. In section III, the security proof of proposed
protocol is given by estimating the upper bound for
latent information leakage. In section IV and V, the
numerical simulations with practical imperfections
show that the performance of the proposed protocol
without active phase randomization is satisfactory
and even better, i.e., it can beat the linear key rate
bound at even shorter distance than other protocols.
So far we only consider threats of collective attack
or coherent attack with infinite key length. A con-
clusion is given in section VI.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
02
33
4v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
22
 M
ar 
20
19
II. SIMPLIFIED TF-QKD
Our simplified TF-QKD protocol removes the
post-selection part of original TF-QKD. Firstly, let
us introduce the flow of this simplified protocol as
following.
Step 1. Alice and Bob randomly choose code mode
or decoy mode[21–23] in each trial.
Step 2.a. If code mode is selected, Alice
(Bob) prepares a weak coherent state | ± √µ〉A-out
(±|√µ〉B-out) according to her (his) random classical
key bit 0 or 1, and sends the prepared state to the
untrusted measurement device controlled by Eve.
Step 2.b If decoy mode is selected, Alice (Bob)
emits phase-randomized weak coherent state with
mean photon-number νa (νb), where νa (νb) is ran-
domly chosen from a pre-decided set. Note that the
phase of weak coherent state in decoy mode will be
never publicly announced. Thus, in decoy mode,
Alice (Bob) actually prepares a mixed state in Fock
space.
Step 3. For each trial, the middle receiver Eve
must publicly announce a successful message |1〉M
or a failure message |0〉M to Alice and Bob. If she
announces |1〉M, she has to simultaneously declare
which message she obtained, |L〉M or |R〉M. For an
honest Eve, |L〉M and |R〉M reveal which detector
clicks[19]. For simplicity, we treat the double-click
event as message |L〉M or |R〉M at random. Note that
|1〉M, |0〉M, |L〉M and |R〉M are all classical messages
announced by Eve, though we use bra-ket notation
to describe them.
Step 4. After repeating steps 1 to 3 for sufficient
times, Alice and Bob publicly announce which trials
are code modes and which trials are decoy modes.
For the trials that Alice and Bob both select the
code mode and Eve announces |L〉M or |R〉M, the
raw key bits are generated. Here, Bob should flip
his bit if Eve announces |R〉M. For the trials that
Alice and Bob both select decoy mode, Alice and
Bob can estimate the yield Yn,m, which means the
probability of Eve announcing |1〉M provided Alice
emits n-photon state and Bob emits m-photon state
in a decoy mode. With these parameters, informa-
tion leakage is bounded so that secret key bits can
be generated from raw key bits by error correction
and privacy amplification.
In the following paper, we will focus on the upper
bound for the information leakage through the whole
protocol.
III. MAIN RESULTS OF SECURITY PROOF
For readability, we sketch the security proof and
its main results here. One may refer to Appendix
A for detailed derivations. We make no more
assumptions to Eve than assumptions applied in
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD[6, 7].
Accordingly, Eve’s general collective attack to the
above simplified TF-QKD protocol can be defined as
an arbitrary measurement after an arbitrary unitary
operation operating on the whole system with her
prepared ancilla[4, 5]. Under photon-number repre-
sentation, this collective attack is given by
Uˆ |n〉A-out|m〉B-out|E0〉Ea|0〉M
=
√
Yn,m|γn,m〉E|1〉M +
√
1− Yn,m|other〉E|0〉M,
(1)
where |n〉A-out and |m〉B-out represent the photon-
number bases of the quantum states prepared by
Alice and Bob respectively, the state |E0〉Ea is the
ancilla of Eve, and Yn,m ∈ [0, 1] is a probability-
like value shows the portion that Alice and Bob re-
ceive the message |1〉M form Eve. On the right side
of Eq.(1), |γn,m〉E and |other〉E are the quantum
states of compound system including Eve’s ancilla
Ea, A-out and B-out, which are all in the hands of
Eve now. Note that any phases of the states on
the right hand side of Eq.(1) are absorbed into the
definition of those states. For simplicity, let’s de-
note Eve’s message |L〉M and |R〉M as the same one
|1〉M, since we only concern Alice’s key bit here, but
not Bob’s bit and his flipping operation. We aim to
bound Eve’s information IAE on Alice’s key bit when
Eve announces message |1〉M. Through derivations
given in the Appendix A, it is proved that this upper
bound IuAE can be solved by the following optimiza-
tion problem given by
IuAE = max h(
x00
Qµ
,
x10
Qµ
) + h(
x11
Qµ
,
x01
Qµ
),
s.t.

0 6 x00 6
∣∣∑
n,m=0
√
P2nP2mY2n,2m
∣∣2,
0 6 x10 6
∣∣∑
n,m=0
√
P2n+1P2mY2n+1,2m
∣∣2,
0 6 x11 6
∣∣∑
n,m=0
√
P2n+1P2m+1Y2n+1,2m+1
∣∣2,
0 6 x01 6
∣∣∑
n,m=0
√
P2nP2m+1Y2n,2m+1
∣∣2,
x00 + x10 + x11 + x01 = Qµ.
(2)
with the definition h(x, y) = −x log2 x − y log2 y +
(x+y) log2(x+y). Here, Pk = e−µµk/k! is the proba-
bility of coherent state ±|√µ〉 containing k-photons,
and Qµ is the probability of Alice obtaining a raw
key bit in code mode, which is directly observed ex-
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perimentally. In practice, agents can observe the
parameters Pn, Pm, Qµ, and Yn,m. Then, the in-
formation leakage bound can be estimated by the
above optimization problem. According to Devetak-
Winter’s bound [24], the secret key rate per trial in
a code mode is then given by
R = Qµ
[
1− fh(eµ, 1− eµ)− IuAE], (3)
in which, eµ is the error rate of raw key bits. This
security proof assumes that Eve only launches collec-
tive attack, however, this restriction can be removed
by following the results in Refs [25, 26]. Hence, our
proof can guarantee the security against the coher-
ent attacks asymptotically. It also ends our security
proof rigorously.
Before proceeding, let’s roughly estimate the per-
formance of the protocol under ideal case, in which
only channel transmission efficiency η is considered,
while all other imperfections, e.g. dark counts of
single photon detectors, are absent. Then, it is ex-
pected that x00 ∼ x11 ∼ µ2O(√η), since the main
contribution of x00 and x11 comes from the yield
of the total photon number from Alice and Bob is
two. With similar argument, we have x01 ∼ x10 ∼
µO(
√
η). Thus, from Eq.(2) we can see IuAE  1
for any η provided a proper value of µ is assumed.
Besides, it is obvious that Qµ ∼ µO(√η) and eµ = 0
in ideal case. Accordingly, from above formulae, we
have R = O(√η). This does reconfirm the expecta-
tion that the TF-QKD can overcome linear bound
even if phase randomization and post-selection are
both removed. In the next two sections, through nu-
merical simulations with practical imperfections we
will show the performance of our protocol with both
infinite and finite decoy states techniques comparing
with other states of the art.
IV. ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION
WITH INFINITE DECOY STATES
In a practical system, Alice and Bob can emit
phase randomized decoy states[21] to estimate Yn,m.
The gain of the decoy states that Alice emits pulse
with mean photon-number νa and Bob emits pulse
with mean photon-number νb shall satisfy
Qνa,νbd =
∑
n,m
P νan P
νb
m Yn,m, (4)
where P νk = e
−ννk/k! is known by both agents.
Considering the ideal case with infinite decoy states
νa and νb, we can list infinite linear equations like
Eq.(4) to calculate Yn,m accurately. Therefore, the
secure key rate can be easily calculated by Eq.(3)
with IuAE given by Eq.(2). Here we simulate the max-
imum secure key rates related to different loss for
multiple protocol with infinite decoy states imple-
ment and practical parameter of experiments. De-
tails can be found in the Appendix B. The results are
shown in Fig.1. We can see that with infinite decoy
states, our protocol has higher key rate than orig-
inal PM-QKD because our protocol is phase post-
selection free and independent with extra error es-
timations. Note that the slope of key rate in our
protocol is the same as linear bound with single re-
peater [27] when the fiber loss is less than 60 dB,
which shows that advantage of beating well-known
linear bound is also reconfirmed through 30 dB to
60 dB fiber loss. In other words, R = O(√η). It
is also remarkable that our protocol can outperform
BB84 at lower channel loss comparing to the original
PM-QKD.
V. ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION WITH
FINITE DECOY STATES
Finite decoy states can also help to estimate the
lower bound for yields[22, 23, 28]. In a practical
system, this implement is much more feasible than
the infinite one. Here we apply decoy states with
four different intensities as µ, ν1, ν2 and 0. After
announcement of decoy modes and each applied in-
tensity, we have gains as Q0,0d , Q
µ,0
d , Q
ν1,0
d , Q
ν2,0
d ,
Q0,µd , Q
0,ν1
d , Q
0,ν2
d , Q
µ,µ
d , Q
ν1,ν1
d and Q
ν2,ν2
d .
Then we show how those statistics can give good
approximations to Y0,0, Y0,1, Y1,0, Y2,0, Y0,2 and Y2,
where Y2 means the yield that are from decoy trials
in which Alice and Bob share 2 photons in total.
From Qµ,0d , Q
ν1,0
d , Q
ν2,0
d and Q
0,0
d , we can obtain
lower bounds and upper bounds of Y0,0, Y0,1, Y0,2
by linear programming on Eq.(4). Similarly, lower
bounds and upper bounds of Y1,0 and Y2,0 can be
estimated from Q0,µd , Q
0,ν1
d , Q
0,ν2
d and Q
0,0
d . Upper
bound and lower bound of Y2 could also be bounded
by the linear programming on four linear equations
of Qµ,µd , Q
ν1,ν1
d , Q
ν2,ν2
d and Q
0,0
d . In the following
text, we use superscript u or l to label the upper
or lower bound for Y obtained here. To estimate
Y1,1, through the relation Y2 =
∑
i P
µ
i P
µ
2−iYi,2−1∑
i P
µ
i P
µ
2−i
,
Y1,1 could be bounded by
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Parameters Values
Dark count rate pd 8× 10−8
Error correction efficiency f 1.15
Detector efficiency ηd 14.5%
Misalignment error eM 0.375%
FIG. 1. Key rates(R) of our protocol(purple), PM-QKD(green)[19] and BB84(orange) with all infinite decoy states
versus different optical fiber losses (dB). Note that we assume zero optical misalignment, except the misalignment
due to phase post-selection (M = 16) of original PM-QKD in Ref.[19]. Linear key rate bound[16](blue) and it with
single repeater[27](blue, dotted) are also shown in the figure.
(2Pµ0 P
µ
2 + P
µ
1 P
µ
1 )Y
l
2 − Pµ0 Pµ2 (Y u0,2 + Y u2,0)
Pµ1 P
µ
1
= Y l1,1 6 Y1,1 6 Y u1,1 =
(2Pµ0 P
µ
2 + P
µ
1 P
µ
1 )Y
u
2 − Pµ0 Pµ2 (Y l0,2 + Y l2,0)
Pµ1 P
µ
1
(5)
Then the remained task is constraining x00, x01, x10
and x11 with these lower bounds and upper bounds
generated from decoy statistics.
Let’s take x00 as an example. From Eq.(2), we
have a general bound that limits the x00 as
x00 6
∣∣ ∑
n,m=0
√
Pµ2nP
µ
2mY2n,2m
∣∣2 6 max
k>2
∣∣√Pµ0 Pµ0 Y u0,0 +√Pµ0 Pµ2 Y u0,2 +√Pµ2 Pµ0 Y u2,0+√√√√ (k + 4)(k − 1)
2
(Qµ,µd −
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i) −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i) +
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)
∣∣2 (6)
The details of the derivation are included in the ap-
pendix B. Now we obtain the bounds of these four
values based on all the observables in our protocol.
The final step is only making an optimization to find
the best information-theoretical secure key rate with
Eq.(3) limited by these bounds.
So far, we show how Alice and Bob can estimate
the lower bound for the key rates under different
losses with four decoy states . We simulate a prac-
tical case for multiple protocols. The results are
shown in Fig.2. Even in the case of finite decoy
states, our protocol’s key rate holds the relation with
transmittance as R = O(√η). Consequently, it can
still beat the linear bound in the loss range from 40
dB to 60 dB.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inspired by TF-QKD protocol and its variants
such as PM-QKD, we proposed a simplified proto-
col with higher final key rate, in which the raw key
bits are generated without active phase randomiza-
tion and phase post-selection. A meticulous secu-
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FIG. 2. Key rates(R) of our protocol(purple), PM-QKD(green)[19] and BB84(orange) with all finite decoy states
versus different optical fiber losses (dB). Note that we assume zero optical misalignment, except the misalignment
due to phase post-selection (M = 16) of original PM-QKD in Ref.[19]. Linear key rate bound[16](blue) and it with
single repeater[27](blue, dotted) are also shown in the figure.
rity proof is presented by estimating the informa-
tion leakage in our protocol. Counterintuitively, our
bound for latent information leakage doesn’t rely on
the error rate. Meanwhile, its advantage of beating
the linear rate-loss limit is still available here, show-
ing that the final key rate R = O(√η) over trans-
mittance η. Besides, thanks to the removal of phase
post-selection, our scheme can perform over the well-
known BB84 at a shorter channel distance compar-
ing to original PM-QKD protocol, which means the
proposed protocol could be very competitive when
channel loss is around 15dB to 60dB.
Note added. After posting our work on arXiv,
two other groups provided similar ideas [29, 30] in-
dependently but didn’t include the practical case
with finite decoy states. In methodology, our work
is based on the analysis of collective attack while the
Ref.[29] presents a proof based on an equivalent en-
tanglement distillation protocol. Besides, both the
Refs.[29, 30] are using infinite decoy states which is
not feasible in the experiments.
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APPENDIX A: SECURITY PROOF
We make no more assumptions to Eve than assumptions applied in measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD[6, 7]. In order to bounding the information leakage to Eve, we have to describe the ultimate
power of Eve under the assumptions. Also, Eve’s strategy must obey the time line through this protocol.
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Therefore, Eve’s general collective attack to the above simplified TF-QKD protocol can be defined as an
arbitrary measurement after an arbitrary unitary operation operating on the whole system with her prepared
ancilla[4, 5]. Furthermore, the message Eve announces should be also obtained from the measurement results.
Under photon-number representation, this collective attack is given by
Uˆ |n〉A-out|m〉B-out|E0〉Ea|0〉M =
√
Yn,m|γn,m〉E|1〉M +
√
1− Yn,m|other〉E|0〉M, (A.7)
where |n〉A-out and |m〉B-out represent the photon-number bases of the quantum states prepared by Alice and
Bob respectively, the state |E0〉Ea is the ancilla of Eve, and Yn,m ∈ [0, 1] is a probability-like value shows the
portion that Alice and Bob receive the message |1〉M form Eve. On the right side of Eq.(A.7), |γn,m〉E and
|other〉E are the quantum states of compound system including Eve’s ancilla Ea, A-out and B-out, which are
all in the hands of Eve. Note that any phases of the states on the right hand side of Eq.(A.7) are absorbed
into the definition of those states. For simplicity, let’s denote Eve’s message |L〉M and |R〉M as the same one
|1〉M, since we only concern Alice’s key bit here, but not Bob’s bit and his flipping operation. Note that this
expression does give the most general collective attack, including possible attacks trying to distinguish decoy
mode and code mode and treat them differently, since Eve’s ancilla is arbitrary. Indeed, any measurement
and following transformation depending on the output of the measurement can be described as a "giant"
unitary operator applied to a larger Hilbert space.
Suppose Alice and Bob each has an ancillary qubit to store their classical key bit in code mode. For
simplicity, here we assume that Alice and Bob’s random binary bits come from measurements of their qubits
in Z bases. So they set their initial qubits to |+〉 and prepare a weak coherent state light pulse with average
photon-number µ. Then the initial prepared state is
|+〉A|+〉B|√µ〉A-out|√µ〉B-out. (A.8)
Then Alice and Bob apply a C-pi gate to upload their information on the output coherent state and measure
their private qubits. Recall Eve’s attack given by Eq.(A.7). For the ease of representation, we define four
intermediate unnormalized states labeled by the photon-number’s parity of A-out and B-out,
|ψee〉 =
∑
n,m
√
P2nP2mY2n,2m|γ2n,2m〉, |ψoo〉 =
∑
n,m
√
P2n+1P2m+1Y2n+1,2m+1|γ2n+1,2m+1〉,
|ψeo〉 =
∑
n,m
√
P2nP2m+1Y2n,2m+1|γ2n,2m+1〉, |ψoe〉 =
∑
n,m
√
P2n+1P2mY2n+1,2m|γ2n+1,2m〉,
(A.9)
where the subscript E is dropped for simplicity. Since Alice and Bob’s encoding phases are 0 or pi, the phase
of Fock state |n〉A-out|m〉B-out will not change if both n and m are odd or even, while |n〉A-out|m〉B-out will
change to −|n〉A-out|m〉B-out if only one of n and m is odd. Thus in code mode, under the same combination
of coding phases, the phase of superposition of |n〉A-out|m〉B-out can be divided into four groups depending the
parity of n and m. This implies we can define Eq.(A.9), which is just the superposition of |n〉A-out|m〉B-out
with different parities. Those states |ψee〉, |ψoo〉, |ψeo〉 and |ψoe〉 are quite useful for simplifying the following
derivations.
It should be taken into account that Eq.(A.7) never implies whether |γn,m〉 are orthogonal to each other or
not. It’s obvious that Alice and Bob can not obtain any direct knowledge of them because they are measured
by Eve. After tracing Bob’s qubit out and measuring Alice’s qubit in Z basis, the unnormalized density
matrix of Eve’s system E and mode A conditioned that |1〉M is announced becomes
ρAE =
1
2
Π{|0〉A} ⊗ (Π{|ψee〉+ |ψoe〉}+ Π{|ψoo〉+ |ψeo〉})
+
1
2
Π{|1〉A} ⊗ (Π{|ψee〉 − |ψoe〉}+ Π{|ψoo〉 − |ψeo〉}),
(A.10)
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where, Π{|ψ〉} = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Then the Holevo bound of ρAE is upper-bounded by
χ(ρAE) 6
h(
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2, ∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2) + h(∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2, ∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2)∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2 = h(
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2
Qµ
,
∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2
Qµ
) + h(
∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2
Qµ
,
∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2
Qµ
)
(A.11)
with the definition h(x, y) = −x log2 x− y log2 y + (x+ y) log2(x+ y), which is different from the definition
of binary Von Neumann entropy. To get the inequality of Eq.(A.11), we first note that Eve’s system E is a
mixture of Π{|ψee〉 + |ψoe〉}, Π{|ψee〉 − |ψoe〉}, Π{|ψoo〉 + |ψeo〉} and Π{|ψoo〉 − |ψeo〉}. Moreover, without
compromising the security, one may assume Eve gets some side-channel information or a partial purification
of ρE, which just honestly tells Eve that her system is one of Π{|ψee〉 + |ψoe〉} and Π{|ψee〉 − |ψoe〉}, or
one of Π{|ψoo〉 + |ψeo〉} and Π{|ψoo〉 − |ψeo〉}. This assumption just helps Eve to guess Alice’s key bit and
simplifies the calculation of χ(ρAE) greatly. The probability of Alice obtaining a raw key bit in a code mode
can be presented by Qµ =
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2. Now, we have clearly show that Eve’s
information on Alice’s classical key bit is bounded by Eq.(A.11) as I(A : E) 6 χ(ρAE), even when the active
phase randomization is removed. According to Devetak-Winter’s bound [24], the secret key rate per trial in
code mode is
R = Qµ
[
1− fh(eµ, 1− eµ)− h(
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2
Qµ
,
∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2
Qµ
)− h(
∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2
Qµ
,
∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2
Qµ
)], (A.12)
in which, eµ is the error rate of raw key bits. To calculate χ(ρAE), these four values
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2, ∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2, ∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2
and
∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2 must be estimated. Obviously, Alice and Bob can relate these values to the direct observables
and statistics, i.e. ∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2 6 ∣∣ ∑
n,m=0
√
P2nP2mY2n,2m
∣∣2,
∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2 6 ∣∣ ∑
n,m=0
√
P2n+1P2mY2n+1,2m
∣∣2,
∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2 6 ∣∣ ∑
n,m=0
√
P2n+1P2m+1Y2n+1,2m+1
∣∣2,
∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2 6 ∣∣ ∑
n,m=0
√
P2nP2m+1Y2n,2m+1
∣∣2,
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2 + ∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2 = Qµ.
(A.13)
With these constraints, one can estimate upper bound of χ(ρAE). By defining x00 ,
∣∣|ψee〉∣∣2, x10 , ∣∣|ψoe〉∣∣2,
x11 ,
∣∣|ψoo〉∣∣2, and x01 , ∣∣|ψeo〉∣∣2, we reach the Eq.(2) in the main text.
APPENDIX B: DETAILS OF MATHEMATICS IN SIMULATION
We derive a simulation scheme for our protocol and give out numerical results. Suppose the dark count
of each detector is pd per trial and each partner sends a coherent state carrying average µ photons. After
the lossy channel and the interference of Alice and Bob’s pulse, the coherent state flows to the correct
detector with zero misalignment of devices and no attack. However, due to the loss and the dark count,
the response probability is less than 1 and may come from the wrong detector. For each trial, the correct
case is when the correct detector provides a response (no matter whether it comes from a dark count
or a real signal) and simultaneously there’s no dark count from another detector. The probability Pc =
(1− pd)[1− (1− pd) exp(−2ηµ)]. Also, an error case occurs when the wrong detector clicks for a dark count
while the correct detector gets nothing, with a probability Pe = (1− pd) exp(−2ηµ)pd. The gain Qµ of code
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mode should be
Qµ = Pc + Pe = (1− pd)[1− (1− pd) exp(−2ηµ)] + (1− pd) exp(−2ηµ)pd (A.14)
The error rate should be
eµ =
Pe
Pc + Pe
=
exp(−2ηµ)pd
1− (1− 2pd) exp(−2ηµ) (A.15)
The above formulas are in accord with results of Ref.[19] with zero misalignment. The misalignment can be
also included both in the gain and error rate, but in our phase-randomization-free protocol we assume the
best performance that the misalignment is zero.
If we apply infinite decoy states, the approximation of Yn,m can be calculate as
Yn,m = 1− (1− pd)2(1− η)n+m. (A.16)
Here, without compromising security, we treat double-click event as message |L〉M or |R〉M at random
to simplify the bound of Yn,m. With the above equations, Eq.(A.13) is bounded by parameters in real
experiments.
If we apply finite decoy states, we can only obtain good bounds for several Yn,m with small n and m. For
the case considered in the main text, linear programing on statistics and Eq.(5) helps to bound Y0,0, Y0,1,
Y1,0, Y2,0, Y0,2 and Y1,1. The upper bound for the right-hand values in Eq.(A.13) could be calculated as an
optimization problem with constrains. Recall the example in the main text.
x00 6
∣∣ +∞∑
n,m=0
√
Pµ2nP
µ
2mY2n,2m
∣∣2 = ∣∣ +∞∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i)
∣∣2
6
∣∣√Pµ0 Pµ0 Y u0,0 +√Pµ0 Pµ2 Y u0,2 +√Pµ2 Pµ0 Y u2,0 + +∞∑
n=2
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i)
∣∣2 (A.17)
∑
n=2
∑n
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i) is untouchable by statistics from only four decoy states. But the constrains
of total gain give an upper bound for this term. The optimization problem can be described as
max
+∞∑
n=2
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i),
s.t.

+∞∑
n=2
n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i) 6 Q
µ,µ
d −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i,
0 6 Yi,j 6 1 ∀i, j ∈ Z,
(A.18)
which could be easily solved numerically. On the other side, we can use an analytical approach for the upper
bound of the aimed function in Eq.(A.18). Since all known probability terms are positive and decrease to zero
exponentially, the above optimization problem satisfies the well-known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker [31] conditions.
Therefore, the maximum is located at the boundary where any Yq,t−q with t > k reaches its upper bound
and others hold the conditions. Then the problem is simplified to finding an integer k > 2 that reaches the
maximum value of the aimed function in Eq.(A.18), say
∞∑
n=2
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i) 6 maxk>2
k∑
n=2
√√√√(n+ 1) n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i) +
∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i).
(A.19)
Here at the right-hand side, k > 2 is an integer waiting for optimization. This inequality is based on
the inequality between arithmetic mean and quadratic mean. Then, the optimization problem Eq.(A.18)
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becomes
max
k>2
k∑
n=2
√
(n+ 1)αn +
∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i),
s.t.

k∑
n=2
αn 6 Qµ,µd −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i,
0 6 αn 6
n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i) , ∀ 2 6 n 6 k.
(A.20)
+∞∑
n=2
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)Y2i,2(n−i) 6 maxk>2
k∑
n=2
√
(n+ 1)αn +
∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)
6 max
k>2
√√√√ (k + 4)(k − 1)
2
(Qµ,µd −
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i) −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i) +
∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i),
(A.21)
where, Cauchy-Schwarz inequality is also used. So the optimization problem Eq.(A.18) becomes finding k
that can maximize the right-hand side of Eq.(A.21). So far we get the last line of Eq.(A.22) in the main
text.
x00 6 max
k>2
∣∣√Pµ0 Pµ0 Y u0,0 +√Pµ0 Pµ2 Y u0,2 +√Pµ2 Pµ0 Y u2,0 + +∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)+√√√√ (k + 4)(k − 1)
2
(Qµ,µd −
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i) −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i)
∣∣2 (A.22)
This method is also effective for estimating upper bounds of x10, x01 and x11. We just post the results below.
x10 6 max
k>1
∣∣√Pµ1 Pµ0 Y u1,0 + +∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2i+1P
µ
2(n−i)+√√√√ (k + 3)k
2
(Qµ,µd −
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
Pµ2i+1P
µ
2(n−i) −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i)
∣∣2 (A.23)
x01 6 max
k>1
∣∣√Pµ0 Pµ1 Y u0,1 + +∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)+1+√√√√ (k + 3)k
2
(Qµ,µd −
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
Pµ2iP
µ
2(n−i)+1 −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i)
∣∣2 (A.24)
x11 6 max
k>1
∣∣√Pµ1 Pµ1 Y u1,1 + +∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
√
Pµ2i+1P
µ
2(n−i)+1+√√√√ (k + 3)k
2
(Qµ,µd −
+∞∑
n=k+1
n∑
i=0
Pµ2i+1P
µ
2(n−i)+1 −
2∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
Pµi P
µ
n−iY
l
i,n−i)
∣∣2 (A.25)
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